Guys, watch out. The below announcement was issued by the ICC today. Days are numbered now.

Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I concerning President Al Bashir of Sudan to be issued on Wednesday 4 March 2009

 

The Hague, 23 February 2009

ICC-CPI-20090223-PR393_ENG

 

Situation : Darfur, Sudan

 

TodayPre-Trial Chamber I announced that it would issue on Wednesday 4 March2009 its decision concerning the Prosecution application of 14 July2008 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against President Omar AlBashir of Sudan.

 

The decision will be made public by the normal way of a press release and publication on the Court's website.

 

23.02.2009 – Public notice of the Decision on the Prosecution's Application under Article 58 of the Statute

 

Prosecution's Application under Article 58

For further information please contact Ms Laurence Blairon, Spokesperson, at +31 (0)70 515 87 14 or +31 (0) 6 46 44 88 89 or at laurence.blairon@icc-cpi.int.

_________________
كنت أعرف ان الله قد رغب في مارق عليه )
( فرفعت رأسي من السجود لأرى من الذي مرق فوجدته أنا

مذكرات ابليس

What are the scenarios of issuing or not issuing a warrant of arrest against Omar Al-basheer ?

Scenario 1:-

In a case of issuing the warrant of arrest and labeling Bashir as a war criminal, the following points are more likely to occur:

A) Sudan will enter an era of rigid political instability and a jungle like predatory doctrine, where only the fittest survives.

B) The Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM will be tossed down the drain since the NCP is the only partner the SLPM has, to enact the aforementioned agreement.

C) More rebellious groups will be inspired to revolt in Sudan and in some neighboring countries.

D) Southern Sudan is most likely to secede unless the SPLM is transformed into a National movement to all the Sudanese peoples to uproot the NCP and refine and redefine the country under its slogan "The New Sudan". The unity price might be the compromise of the application of Sharia Laws by Northerners with a federal or a confederal system to regulate relations for states and citizens.

E) The elections might get postponed if not forfeited.

Scenario 2:-

In a case of not issuing a warrant of arrest against Albashir:

A) Albashir and his party will have a sense of political victory over the ICC. As a result, NCP will increase military attacks on JEM and SLA.

B) The ICC will lose its credibility worldwide and more war criminals will be born.

C) NCP will prolong peace talks in Doha while militarily gaining more grounds in Darfur . i.e Muhajriya battle to have the upper hand in negotiating to dictate terms and offers to its opponents.

D) The status quo shall continue unless a peoples' mobilization and uprise occur to vanquish the current regime. Abood and Nemeri are examples of such uprise.

The best and wise decision the ICC can make, is to delay its decision until the elections are over and a new president is chosen. Not only will it save Sudan and the IGAD region the aftermath of the NCP's wrath, but it will be easier then to arrest Albashir. By then, Albashir will have no power and he will no longer be commander in chief.

Good input Psychorus. I highly value your attempt to draw on the possible scenarios; however; I disagree with the plausibility of some of your points. SPLM is no longer capable of uprooting the NCP. SPLM lacks a charismatic leader as its late one John Garang. it lacks popularity among northern Sudanese and most importantly, it is yet to master the art of political maneuvers and manipulation in which the NCP is a champion.

What is suggested by you as "The best and wise decision the ICC can make" is simply not possible. ICC has no jurisdiction to defer the decision, only the Security Council has such power. when the ICC issues its decision and remits it to the Security Council, members of the council will decide whether to defer or adopt the decision. This is when politics will come in. On one hand, the African and Arab countries in the council may propose a deferral, on the hand, you have other countries who are ready to veto it because in their view, the Sudanese government is not doing enough to advance Darfur peace process.

I am really apprehensive about how the government might react, I fear it will revert back to its old-time methods of cracking down on Sudanese citizens whom it suspects of being supportive of the ICC.

the clock is ticking now and the situation does not give optimistic readings.

Peace
_________________
كنت أعرف ان الله قد رغب في مارق عليه )
( فرفعت رأسي من السجود لأرى من الذي مرق فوجدته أنا

مذكرات ابليس

I have posted a reply this morning; but surprisingly, it disappeared. There's no harm in posting it again though. Ferfer, I have the same exact feeling about the gov. reverting to its old wicked and crocked methods of dealing with the ICC issue internally. Aside from the technical process of deferring or adopting the decision, the ICC could ask for more time for a pursuit of conclusive evidence. In legal & technical terms, however, the ICC has no jurisdiction over Sudan since Sudan is not a member of the International Criminal Court. This case is legally paralleled to Israel and the IAEA. Israel is not bound by the IAEA and the nuclear proliferation treaties' conformity, for Israel is not a member of the IAEA.

Psychorus.

It's not true that the ICC has no jurisdiction over Sudan. how?

Sudan is a signatory to the Rome Statue which founded the ICC but the fact that Sudan has not ratified Rome Statue internally makes it exempt from falling under ICC jurisdictions. but being a member of the court is not the only case that makes you subject to ICC jurisdiction.

If you refer to Rome Statue, it states that the ICC can prosecute crimes in three cases, one of which is if the case has been referred to the court by the Security Council. The security council did refer Darfur case to the ICC, therefore the ICC has acquired jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territories of Darfur region. moreover; at the time when the Security Council referred Darfur case to the ICC, the government made no objection, instead, it invited Ocampo to visit Sudan and took him on a tour in Darfur states. Ironic, isn't it?

Conclusive evidences have already been adduced to the court by its prosecutor. the pre-trial chamber 1 had examined these evidences and now it wants to announce its decision. I don't see why more time?

I believe Al-Bashir should step down and spare us and himself the humiliation of having an indicted person as a head of our already failed state.

Peace
_________________
كنت أعرف ان الله قد رغب في مارق عليه )
( فرفعت رأسي من السجود لأرى من الذي مرق فوجدته أنا

مذكرات ابليس

Ferfer,

More time was intended for the hypothetical/idealistic best and wise case scenario until the elections are over. I'm in no defense of the current regime, but I'm thinking of the lesser of two evils.

As for the Rome statute & according to the law of treaties, a state that has signed but not ratified a treaty is obliged to refrain from " acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty;however, these obligations do not continue if the state makes clear that it does not intend to become party to the treaty (un.org/law). Thus, the sudanese government is fully embracing this exception as a loop-hole in their case before the ICC.

For example, The U.S is one of the signatories, but on May 6, 2002, the Bush's administration informed the United Nation's Secretary General that " the U.S does not intend to become a party of the treaty." Accordingly, The U.S has no legal obligations arising from its signature. The Sudanese gov. is taking the U.S case as its legal precedence, but will the ICC be fair enough to grant Sudan the same right as it did to the U.S is a question that is answered in the ICC's sentence on the 4th.

The fact that the ICC is investigating crimes committed within the territories of Darfur region has nothing to do with Sudan being or not being a signatory to the Rome Statue.

As I previously explained, the ICC has gained jurisdictions over Sudan due to the fact that the case of Darfur crimes was referred to it by the Security Council. if today the Security Council decides to refer the case of the crimes committed during the US occupation of Iraq to the ICC, US soldiers and officials will be subject to ICC jurisdictions.

You are trying to defend yourself against something I did not accuse you of in the first place. I was not implying that you are in defense of the regime. I agree with you that the ICC procedures are likely to have very negative effects on peace and stability in Sudan but I hate the fact that we are put in the position of choosing between justice and peace or less of the evils.

Anyway, we are way past the stage of wishing for more time, there is no time anymore and the arrest warrant will be issued as far as I can tell, whether the judges will agree to the genocide counts or not is the main question I am concerned about at the moment.

Peace
_________________
كنت أعرف ان الله قد رغب في مارق عليه )
( فرفعت رأسي من السجود لأرى من الذي مرق فوجدته أنا

مذكرات ابليس

interesting discussion ferfer and psychorus, today maybe the beginning of the end....i feel an eerie calmness about the place and im not even in sudan, im on tenterhooks in anticipation of the decision.

rabbana yastor!

Added note: the Security Council is an outdated sick joke. the permanent members use it like a play thing to give their underhand maneouvres some legality.

Its sad that the decision, to indite him or to not indite him, is going to be because of political motivation rather than the real and deserving reason.....those innocents caught up in the whole thing.

Cour
Pénale
Internationale
International
Criminal
Court
Original: English No.: ICC-02/05-01/09
Date: 4 March 2009
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I
Before: Judge Akua Kuenyehia, Presiding Judge
Judge Anita Usacka
Judge Sylvia Steiner
SITUATION IN DAFÜR, SUDAN
IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR v. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR ("OMAR AL
BASHIR")
Public Document
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 1/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 1/8 SL PT
Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations of the Court to:
The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence
Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor
Mr Essa Faal, Senior Trial Lawyer
Legal Representatives of Victims Legal Representatives of Applicants
Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants for
Participation/Reparation
The Office of Public Counsel for
Victims
The Office of Public Counsel for the
Defence
States' Representatives Amicus Curiae
REGISTRY
Registrar
Ms Silvana Arbia
Defence Support Section
Victims and Witnesses Unit Detention Section
Victims Participation and Reparations Other
Section
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 2/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 2/8 SL PT
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I of the International Criminal Court ("the Chamber" and
"the Court" respectively);
HAVING EXAMINED the "Prosecution's Application under Article 58" ("the
Prosecution Application"), filed by the Prosecution on 14 July 2008 in the record of
the situation in Darfur, Sudan ("the Darfur situation") requesting the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (hereinafter referred to as
"Omar Al Bashir") for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;1
HAVING EXAMINED the supporting material and other information submitted by
the Prosecution;2
NOTING the "Decision on the Prosecution's Request for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir"3 in which the Chamber held that it was satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir is criminally
responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute as an indirect perpetrator, or as an
indirect co-perpetrator,4 for war crimes and crimes against humanity and that his
arrest appears to be necessary under article 58(l)(b) of the Rome Statute ("the
Statute");
NOTING articles 19 and 58 of the Statute;
CONSIDERING that, on the basis of the material provided by the Prosecution in
support of the Prosecution Application and without prejudice to any subsequent
determination that may be made under article 19 of the Statute, the case against
Omar Al Bashir falls within the jurisdiction of the Court;
1 ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp; ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Anxsl-89; Corrigendum ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Corr and
Corrigendum ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Corr-Anxsl & 2; and Public redacted version ICC-02/05-157 and ICC-
02/05-157-AnxA.
2 ICC-02/05-161 and !CC-02/05-161-Conf-AnxsA-J; ICC-02/05-179 and ICC-02/05-179-Conf-Exp-Anxsl-5;
ICC-02/05-183-US-Exp and ICC-02/05-183-Conf-Exp-AnxsA-E.
3ICC-02/05-01/09-1.
4 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka to the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir", Part IV.
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 3/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 3/8 SL PT
CONSIDERING that, on the basis of the material provided by the Prosecution in
support of the Prosecution Application, there is no ostensible cause or self-evident
factor to impel the Chamber to exercise its discretion under article 19(1) of the Statute
to determine at this stage the admissibility of the case against Omar Al Bashir;
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that from March 2003
to at least 14 July 2008, a protracted armed conflict not of an international character
within the meaning of article 8(2) (f) of the Statute existed in Darfur between the
Government of Sudan ("the GoS") and several organised armed groups, in particular
the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army ("the SLM/A") and the Justice and
Equality Movement ("the JEM");
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that soon after the
attack on El Fasher airport in April 2003, the GoS issued a general call for the
mobilisation of the Janjaweed Militia in response to the activities of the SLM/A, the
JEM and other armed opposition groups in Darfur, and thereafter conducted,
through GoS forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed
Militia, the Sudanese Police Force, the National Intelligence and Security Service
("the NISS") and the Humanitarian Aid Commission ("the HAC"), a counterinsurgency
campaign throughout the Darfur region against the said armed
opposition groups; and (ii) that the counter-insurgency campaign continued until the
date of the filing of the Prosecution Application on 14 July 2008;
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that a core
component of the GoS counter-insurgency campaign was the unlawful attack on that
part of the civilian population of Darfur - belonging largely to the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups5 - perceived by the GoS as being close to the SLM/A, the JEM and
the other armed groups opposing the GoS in the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur;
and (ii) that, as part of this core component of the counter-insurgency campaign, GoS
5 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Uäacka to the ''Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir", Part III. B.
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 4/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 4/8 SL PT
forces systematically committed acts of pillaging after the seizure of the towns and
villages that were subject to their attacks;6
CONSIDERING, therefore, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that from
soon after the April 2003 attack in El Fasher airport until 14 July 2008, war crimes
within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(i) and 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute were committed
by GoS forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed
Militia, the Sudanese Police Force, the NISS and the HAC, as part of the abovementioned
GoS counter-insurgency campaign;
CONSIDERING, further, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, insofar as
it was a core component of the GoS counter-insurgency campaign, there was a GoS
policy to unlawfully attack that part of the civilian population of Darfur - belonging
largely to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups - perceived by the GoS as being
close to the SLM/A, the JEM and other armed groups opposing the GoS in the
ongoing armed conflict in Darfur;
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the unlawful
attack on the above-mentioned part of the civilian population of Darfur was (i)
widespread, as it affected, at least, hundreds of thousands of individuals and took
place across large swathes of the territory of the Darfur region; and (ii) systematic, as
the acts of violence involved followed, to a considerable extent, a similar pattern;
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, as part of the
GoS's unlawful attack on the above-mentioned part of the civilian population of
Darfur and with knowledge of such attack, GoS forces subjected, throughout the
6 Including in inter aha (i) the first attack on Kodoom on or about 15 August 2003; (11) the second attack on
Kodoom on or about 31 August 2003; (in) the attack on Bindisi on or about 15 August 2003; (iv) the aerial
attack on Mukjar between August and September 2003; (v) the attack on Arawala on or about 10 December
2003; (vi) the attack on Shattaya town and its surrounding villages (including Kailek) in February 2004; (vii) the
attack on Muhajenya on or about 8 October 2007: (vni) the attacks on Saraf Jidad on 7, 12 and 24 January 2008;
(ix) the attack on Silea on 8 February 2008; (x) the attack on Sirba on 8 February 2008; and (xi) the attack on
Abu Suruj on 8 February 2008; (xii) the attack to Jebel Moon between 18 and 22 February 2008.
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 5/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 5/8 SL PT
Darfur region, thousands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups, to acts of murder and extermination;7
CONSIDERING that there are also reasonable grounds to believe that, as part of the
GoS's unlawful attack on the above-mentioned part of the civilian population of
Darfur and with knowledge of such attack, GoS forces subjected, throughout the
Darfur region, (i) hundreds of thousands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts of forcible transfer;8 (ii) thousands of civilian
women, belonging primarily to these groups, to acts of rape;9 and (iii) civilians,
belonging primarily to the same groups, to acts of torture;10
CONSIDERING therefore that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, from
soon after the April 2003 attack on El Fasher airport until 14 July 2008, GoS forces,
including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia, the
Sudanese Police Force, the NISS and the HAC, committed crimes against humanity
consisting of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape, within the
meaning of articles 7(1 )(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) respectively of the Statute, throughout
the Darfur region;
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir
has been the de jure and de facto President of the State of Sudan and Commander-in-
7 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar and Arawala and surrounding villages in Wadi
Salih, Mukjar and Garsila-Deleig localities in West Darfur between August and December 2003; (ii) the towns
of Shattaya and Kailek in South Darfur in February and March 2004; (iii) between 89 and 92 mainly Zaghawa,
Masalit and Misseriya Jebel towns and villages in Buram Locality in South Darfur between November 2005 and
September 2006; (iv) the town of Muhajeriya in the Yasin locality in South Darfur on or about 8 October 2007;
(v) the towns of Saraf Jidad, Abu Suruj, Sirba, Jebel Moon and Silea towns in Kulbus locality in West Darfur
between January and February 2008; and (vi) Shegeg Karo and al-Ain areas in May 2008.
8 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar and Arawala and surrounding villages in Wadi
Salih, Mukjar and Garsila-Deleig localities in West Darfur between August and December 2003; (ii) the towns
of Shattaya and Kailek in South Darfur in February and March 2004; (iii) between 89 and 92 mainly Zaghawa,
Masalit and Misseriya Jebel towns and villages in Buram Locality in South Darfur between November 2005 and
September 2006; (iv) the town of Muhajeriya in the Yasin locality in South Darfur on or about 8 October 2007;
and (v) the towns of Saraf Jidad. Abu Suruj, Sirba, Jebel Moon and Silea towns in Kulbus locality in West
Darfur between January and February 2008.
9 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Bindisi and Arawala in West Darfur between August and December
2003; (ii) the town of Kailek in South Darfur in February and March 2004; and (iii) the towns of Sirba and Silea
in Kulbus locality in West Darfur between January and February 2008.
10 Including in inter alia: (i) the town of Mukjar in West Darfur in August 2003; (ii) the town of Kailek in South
Darfur in March 2004; and (iii) the town of Jebel Moon in Kulbus locality in West Darfur in February 2008.
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 6/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 6/8 SL PT
Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces from March 2003 to 14 July 2008, and that, in
that position, he played an essential role in coordinating, with other high-ranking
Sudanese political and military leaders, the design and implementation of the abovementioned
GoS counter-insurgency campaign;
CONSIDERING, further, that the Chamber finds, in the alternative, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that the role of Omar Al Bashir went beyond
coordinating the design and implementation of the common plan; (ii) that he was in
full control of all branches of the "apparatus" of the State of Sudan, including the
Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police
Force, the NISS and the HAC; and (iii) that he used such control to secure the
implementation of the common plan;
CONSIDERING that, for the above reasons, there are reasonable grounds to believe
that Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible as an indirect perpetrator, or as an
indirect co-perpetrator,11 under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, for:
i. intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities as a war
crime, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute;
ii. pillage as a war crime, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the
Statute;
iii. murder as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(l)(a)
of the Statute;
iv. extermination as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article
7(l)(b) of the Statute;
v. forcible transfer as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article
7(1 )(d) of the Statute;
11 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita USacka to the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir", Part IV.
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 7/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 7/8 SL PT
vi. torture as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(l)(f) of
the Statute; and
vii. rape as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(1 )(g) of
the Statute;
CONSIDERING that, under article 58(1) of the Statute, the arrest of Omar Al Bashir
appears necessary at this stage to ensure (i) that he will appear before the Court; (ii)
that he will not obstruct or endanger the ongoing investigation into the crimes for
which he is allegedly responsible under the Statute; and (iii) that he will not continue
with the commission of the above-mentioned crimes;
FOR THESE REASONS,
HEREBY ISSUES:
A WARRANT OF ARREST for OMAR AL BASHIR, a male, who is a national of the
State of Sudan, born on 1 January 1944 in Hoshe Bannaga, Shendi Governorate, in the
Sudan, member of the Jaàli tribe of Northern Sudan, President of the Republic of the
Sudan since his appointment by the RCC-NS on 16 October 1993 and elected as such
successively since 1 April 1996 and whose name is also spelt Omar al-Bashir, Omer
Hassan Ahmed El Bashire, Omar al-Bashir, Omar al-Beshir, Omar el-Bashir, Omer
Albasheer, Omar Elbashir and Omar Hassan Ahmad el-Beshir.
Done in English, Arabic and French, the English version being authoritative.
Judge Akua Kuenyehia
Presiding Judge
Judge Anita Usarka
Dated this Wednesday, 4 March 2009
At The Hague, The Netherlands
No. ICC-02/05-01/09
Judge Sylvia Steiner
8/8 4 March 2009
ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 8/8 SL PT
_________________
Reach Your hands into the Sky and you can play with the Stars.

test post

shamshar : laaw sama7ta yaakh. Conduct your testing away from this post and stop this lack of decency.

Ferfer,

Quote:

whether the judges will agree to the genocide counts or not is the main question I am concerned about at the moment.

U.N. report: Darfur not genocide


UNITED NATIONS (CNN) -- The government of Sudan and militias have acted together in committing widespread atrocities in Darfur that should be prosecuted by an international war crimes tribunal, but the violent acts do not amount to genocide, a U.N. commission has said.

The commission, charged with investigating the violence that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 1.8 million people, found that "most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians."

"In particular, the commission found that government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur," the commission said in its 176-page report.

"These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity."

However, the commission said it does not believe the atrocities committed amount to a policy of genocide, as the United States has alleged.

"The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central government authorities are concerned," the report said.

"Generally speaking, the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds."

The commission goes on to say that it recognizes that in some instances, individuals -- including Sudanese government officials -- "may commit acts with genocidal intent."

"Whether this was the case in Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case basis," it said.

The commission added: "International offenses such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide."

The commission said it was withholding the names of those behind the violence, but said senior government officials and military commanders may be responsible "for knowingly failing to prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes."

It said the names were being withheld publicly to protect witnesses from retribution, to respect due process and because the commission was not vested with investigative or prosecutorial powers.

"The commission instead will list the names in a sealed file that will be placed in the custody of the U.N. secretary-general," the report said.

It also said the material should be passed on to the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, which prosecutes war crimes and other atrocities.

The report found that Arab Janjaweed militias in Darfur were "acting, under the authority, with the support, complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese State authorities."

The conflict in Darfur began intensifying in 2003, when two non-Arab African groups took up arms against what they believed to be the Arab-dominated government's discrimination against black Africans.

A counterinsurgency campaign ensued, in which the Janjaweed -- a term that literally means "devil on a horse" -- committed atrocities that have devastated the region.

The report found that some recruits for the Janjaweed are fighters from Libya, Chad and other nations.

The report also said Sudan's People's Armed Forces played a key role in the armed conflict, and that the National Security and Intelligence Service had a central role and "is responsible for the design, planning and implementation of policies associated with the conflict."

The commission was formed in October 2004 and its members visited Sudan in November and January of this year. Its investigative team remained in Sudan from November through January.

The commission found that the atrocities continued, even as it met with Sudanese officials.

The United Nations has estimated that more than 70,000 people have died in Sudan, the result of the violence and malnutrition plaguing the area.

But U.N. officials say the number is believed to be much higher than that, because the United Nations has documented deaths only since April 2004.

The conflict has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people within Darfur, with another 200,000 fleeing to neighboring Chad, according to U.N. figures.

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/01/31/sudan.report/